Introduction

Getting the right people interested in the crop business, which was Mama Mmari's original idea, wasn't possible but Mama Mmari and Henry did not give up the idea of cooperation.
They eventually managed to start a Savings and Credit Cooperative Society together with fourteen other business owners.
The preconditions in the situations described above are very different. Yet, in both areas, small-businesses that are receiving regional development support, struggle to facilitate cooperation, but encounter problems of trust.
Within research on entrepreneurship and small-business, and not the least among those focusing on networks and clusters (cf. Saxenian 1994 , Maillat 1995 , Johannisson 1995 , Bachmann 2003 , the importance of cooperation and trust is often either mentioned or is present as an underlying assumption. Trust is a component of the social capital (Coleman 1988 ) often referred to. Within the multidisciplinary field of trust research, the lion's share of the articles are conceptual in nature, and as a result has paid insufficient attention to exploring how trust formation may be contingent on differing contextual circumstances. Empirical studies of trust and cooperation are often undertaken in societies or formal organisations where a stable and reliable macro system of governance and hierarchy prevails (cf.
contributions of Powell, Burt and Knez; Zucker et al. 1996, in Kramer and Tyler 1999, as well as Knights et al. and Maguire et al. in the Organization Studies Special Issue 2001) . Studies of trust undertaken in non-western contexts (cf. Hagen and Choe 1998, Child and Möllering 2003) and guided by a more cross-cultural approach (Child 2000) indicate that differences in the institutional make-up may be significant and should be taken into account (cf. Bachmann
2000).
This paper takes its point of departure in a comparative cross-cultural and ethnographically inspired study. The aim is to explore, by means of comparison, the contextual preconditions for the trust-formation process. How are we to conceive the 'the rules of the game' and their impact on trust development? What influences these 'rules of the game' and, in this respect, what can we learn from the differences and similarities between the contexts?
Although this paper will emphasize the empirical findings, in order to make more sense to the reader I will first describe the theoretical framework and definitions used, as well as present the methodology. This will be followed by the elaboration of the two case stories. I shall then summarize the findings according to the framework, before highlighting contributions to theory and practice.
Tentative Framework
In this section, the concepts involved will be defined and a tentative framework of trust and its prerequisites is proposed. This is a study of small-business owners and their cooperation. The concepts 'business owner' and 'entrepreneur' are not equated in this paper. Business owners may or may not be entrepreneurial. The definition of entrepreneurship used here is inspired by Schumpeter (1934 Schumpeter ( /1994 and focuses on finding new combinations of already existing features. Therefore in this paper, entrepreneurship is conceived as imaginatively creating a new opportunity and then actualising it.
Cooperation is defined as a situation where people act 'in the interest of the collectivity, and refrain from opportunistic actions even though immediate or short term rewards are not forthcoming' (Alvesson and Lindkvist 1993, p.433) . All human actions have an inherent component of risk taking, and in cooperation, a large portion of the risk has to do with the actions of others. Trust, inspired by Rousseau et al. (1998) as well as by others, is defined as a 'state of mind of willingness to accept vulnerability to actions of others based on positive expectations of their behaviour' (Tillmar 2002, p.250 ). The definition is broad, but highlights some important distinctions. Trust is distinguished from gambling in that the positive expectations are based on what is taken to be 'good reasons' (Lewis and Weigert 1985) , but there are never any logical proofs involved in trust (Luhmann 1979) .
'The rules of the game' (North 1990) are used here as an umbrella term for the various prescriptions of 'how to do things around here' that exist in the societies in which the smallbusiness cooperation is embedded (cf. Granovetter 1985) . To use the terms employed by North (1990) (Havnevik and Hårsmar 1999, p.42) .
Among authors who have considered 'the rules of the game' in relation to trust development, some focus on the influence of the formal institutional framework. As early as 1986 Zucker noted that bureaucracies, regulation and insurance mechanisms became important sources of trust in the disrupted US society after 1840. More recently, Deakin and Wilkinson (2000) argued that building of processual trust cannot be regarded in isolation from the institutional framework. Other authors, such as Fukuyama (1996) , focus on informal institutions. He argues that trust has cultural roots, i.e. depend on 'inherited ethical habit' (p.34), and stems from the level of spontaneous sociability in a community. In a similar vein, some authors view trust as a component of the social capital of a region (Coleman 1988 , Maillat 1995 .
As formal and informal institutions influence each other, virtuous and vicious circles of trust in a society may emerge. This has been approached from different angles. As an example, Putnam (1993) argued that citizenship solidarity was important for the functioning of institutions, whereas Sitkin (1995) and Sztompka (1999) argue that formal institutions contribute to the creation of trust. In his macro-level oriented theory of trust Sztompka (1999) discusses the influence of historical tradition and structural context (accountability of persons and institutions, stability of social order etc.) in creating a culture of trust. At the same time, he recognizes the central role of individuals and their social mood (optimism, future and success orientation, trusting impulse etc.) and collective capital (wealth, education, robust family, religious beliefs etc). Sztompka thus combines recognising different institutions while managing to avoid determinism. Sztompka also recognises the vicious and virtuous circles that emerge as the culture of trust, in turn, influences historical tradition and structural context. His theory, drawing on examples from a transitional society (Poland), appears meaningful for an analysis of the Tanzanian context. The tentative framework of trust and the dimensions belonging to it presented below is inspired by this theory, in combination with a number of more micro-level oriented theories on trust which are to be found in organisational theory.
Insert Figure 1 -The t(h)ree dimensions of trust -here
Flourishing cooperation can be regarded as the crown of the tree of trust. The rules of the game in society can be illustrated by the soil out of which the tree of trust grows. Formal and informal institutions are nutrients to this soil, enabling the cooperative tree to survive, grow and flourish. Elsewhere (Tillmar 2002) , I have discussed at length the three dimensions; reasons, focal levels and objects. In short, the view taken here is that trust may be based on knowledge of someone's character, but also on safeguards such as the availability of sanctions (Sztompka 1999) and natural hostage situations (Shapiro et al. 1992, Lewicki and Bunker 1995) i . These three reasons for trust may be considered as the roots of the tree. The trunk of the tree is composed of three building blocks, related to three levels that trust may focus on, general (Fukuyama 1996) , category (Pettersson 1999) and specific (cf. Lewicki and Bunker 1995, Ring 1996) . This symbolises that the trustor's trust in someone may not only be related to the specific person, but also to trust in the category to which he/she belongs as well as to general trust in people in a given society. The trunk of trust then divides into three branches relating to the trusted behaviour of the trustee. That is to say, trust may concern the idéa that the trustee's behaviour reflects goodness (or benevolence), capability (cf. Nooteboom 1996) and/or commitment (Pettersson 1999) . Trust in a given cooperation is often based on a variety of reasons, exists on various levels, and is directed at various objects in combination.
Methodology
This article is built on two rather extensive qualitative studies rendered in more detail elsewhere (Tillmar 2002) . Below, the methodology used in the two separate studies and the reflections relating to the research process as a whole will be discussed.
Using divergent cases
Understanding how various rules of the game affect preconditions for trust and cooperation can be facilitated by contrasting two divergent contexts. As Ragin (1989) ' (p.43-44) . Crosscultural studies also help to reveal and explain patterns of behaviour which we would not be able to identify without an alternative pattern to provide a contrast (Brislin 1980 , Stewart et al. 1994 ). Bachmann (2000) also puts cross-national and comparative studies high on the research agenda, due to the need to understand how trust is influenced by different elements of the institutional framework and how they interact with each other.
The Swedish case
The Swedish study focuses on business owners linked to a tourism association in an area that is here fictitiously called Karlshöjden. The association had received EU-funding for a project aimed at developing the tourism industry in the area. Observations, in combination with 24 interviews, were used. Eighteen people were interviewed. Four business owners, as well as the project manager could be regarded as 'key informants', whom I met with at least twice.
An ethnographically inspired component of this study Sköldberg 1994, Alvesson and Deetz 2000) involved participant observations of eight meetings, one full day conference and one full day 'mini-exhibition', as well as social gatherings connected to these events. During one of my visits to Karlshöjden, I stayed there as a tourist for three days. I got to know the place, felt atmosphere, visited restaurants and had conversations with shopowners.
The interviews were conducted in three phases. In phase 1 (November 1997-February 1998) I interviewed the key informants, who were active both on the board of the tourism association and in the management group of the project -they were the project manager, three board members and one active participant. In my choice of four business owners, two were female and two male and each informant represented one of the four parts of the municipality of Karlshöjden. During phase 2 (May-August 1998) I obtained new perspectives from six new interviewees as well as returning to four of the key informants. This was necessary in order to see whether their views had changed. During phase 3 (January 1999), two out of four interviews were conducted with people I had previously interviewed. I had by then followed the project for one year and three months.
The Tanzanian case
To mitigate the problem of studying a different cultural context, I designed the Tanzanian study to enable as broad and rich an understanding of the context and the informal institutions as possible. The empirical study may be divided into three phases. March there were many occasions for observing the business training sessions, as I was an advisor to the local District Council, which was one of the training organizers. These observations were not planned to be part of the study but contributed by adding confidence to the interview results.
In Phase 3 (during January 2001) the area was revisited. The focus then was on the emerging cooperation among business people in the town and their way of thinking about the change.
Mr Mechack at the Chamber of Commerce, who had followed the developments during the autumn in real-time, was again an important source of information. The same applies to the two key informants who were available. The two others were not available during this period, and were substituted by close colleagues.
Reflections
The ethnographically inspired approach in the empirical studies including socialising with local people and having local friends brought me close to the empirical contexts. In Tanzania, this approach enabled me to reach a rather deep understanding of the local 'rules of the game' for a mzungo (white person). However, a coin always has a flipside. The risk that I experienced with combining research with development work during the same period was that interviewees would have difficulty separating my role as a development worker and my role as a researcher. When visiting the business training scheme, the role was therefore solely as an observer. The trainers were advised at special meetings, and thus my role was not that of advisor or trainer in the class-room. I saw a potential risk that business owners could try to influence my view of their operations, hoping to obtain credit or other benefits from me and/or the project. I was very attentive to signals of such behaviour and in the selection of key informants an important criterion was their ability to understand the distinction between the two roles. In this selection process, I received advice from the Executive Officer of TCCIA as well as from other knowledgeable local colleagues. I carefully explained that discussions and interviews were not linked to the development programme and that information I was given about specific businesses and specific cooperation would not be forwarded to affect decisions there.
The linear image, promoted above to show the empirical phases, is not very informative either of the underlying research process or of how this paper has progressed. I would characterize the research process as abductive (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000) involving the interplay of deductive and inductive phases. Continuous literature studies have helped me to gradually interpret existing field experiences. The two studies have of course many facets, and several interpretations and analyses are possible. Both cases are rendered at more length and in a narrative form elsewhere (Tillmar 2002) . For reasons of space, I hereby draw on selected case material aimed at illustrating the third-order interpretation I have arrived at after working with the material for two years, leaving it for two years and then returning to it (cf. Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000) .
During the research process, having been inspired by Molander (1993) , I have alternated between focusing on part and whole, near and distant, as well as action (interviewing) and reflection (interpretation). Both empirical studies were carried out in different phases, allowing for longer periods of distance and reflection over the whole picture in between. This, in combination with the use of key informants, facilitated my return to the field to ensure that interpretations made were appropriate. Contrasting the two divergent contexts also enabled mirroring them in each other and arriving at re-interpretations. To mention an example, an initial interpretation was very critical to the project in Karlshöjden. Having understood the influence of the Jante law (to be explained below), the interpretation was modified, only to be further reinterpreted when faced with the comparison with Singida. Returning to this empirical material after two years of other work, I was once again able to understand new aspects, and could illuminate the role of necessity driven entrepreneurial trust creation.
In order to make these quite extensive studies comprehensible to the reader, and also to highlight the issues central to this particular paper, I have chosen to present the material in condensed form while inserting quotes which are generative in the theorising process.
Contrasting Cases
Karlshöjden, Sweden
Karlshöjden is a small Swedish town whose centre comprises a Main Street and shops. The town feels like a combination of an idyllic spot and an old industrial community. Some houses are wooden and colourfully painted, whereas others are grey apartment complexes made of concrete. It is a town of contrasts. Apart from the town, the municipality of According to a number of interviewees there were few tangible results. By the end of the study, the disagreement regarding the booking agency had not been resolved. Yet some argued that bus trips to the town had increased during 1998. Others said that an attitudinal change had taken place. The changing views on cooperation were expressed clearly by interviewees and could also be observed during a mini-fair in March 1998. The business owners interacted cheerfully with each other and some disclosed information about prices for example, during this mini-fair. Three of the interviewees maintained that it had become more natural to advertise jointly and recommend one another than it used to be: However, such knowledge is difficult to obtain. When deciding who to include in a cooperative venture, people consider the assets in town of thepotential members': 'it was people who already had assets ... a house [...] 
this reduce the temptation to disappear'.
During the period of empirical study, cooperation was to a larger extent regarded as possible 
Re-contextualising Trust and Cooperation
Let us recall that the rules of the game can be regarded as the soil out of which the tree of trust, and hence cooperation, grows. In some areas, the soil is more fertile than in others. But the soil also receives its nutrients from different sources in different contexts. Below, I
compare and discuss the endowment of the different sources of nutrients in the two contexts, before reflecting on lessons learnt with regard to preconditions for the trust formation process.
Tanzania is a society in transition towards the post-traditional and modern or, expressed differently, towards a society where the aspect of Gesellschaft is becoming more salient relative to Gemeinschaft (Asplund 1991) . Informal institutions have to a large extent been disrupted, but formal institutions have not become embedded and trusted by the citizens (Giddens 1990 ). The prevailing culture of distrust is thus not surprising (cf. Luhman 1979 , Zucker 1996 , Sztompka 1999 . A vicious circle is at hand, where the culture of distrust leads to negative effects on social stability, perceptions of accountability, people's optimism and resources (cf. Sztompka 1999).
Business owners in Karlshöjden are working in a stable context, one where to a high extent the citizens trust the judicial system, the police and the government officials. These structural features can thus act as sources of basic trust in society (Shapiro 1987 , Sztompka 1999 ). In addition, there is a free press able to examine the different institutions. The system builds on a paradox discussed by Sztompka (1998) Karlshöjden this informal institution is called the 'Jante law'. In Singida, the successful were more likely to be subject to witchcraft.
Both cases indicate that trust at the category level is of significant importance in the trust formation process and that it is influenced by informal institutions. Most apparent in these studies were the institutions of gender and 'tribalism'. In Tanzania, women's 'goodness' (or benevolence) was trusted more than men's, but their competence was distrusted. Yet gender based stereotypes (Acker 1992 , Ahl 2004 ) also affected trust development in the western context. In Karlshöjden, female business owners for example were not trusted to be committed to their business. Looking at the Tanzanian case, it was especially obvious how the development of trust between males and females was adversely affected by the fact that it was not accepted to socialise as colleagues. Common to both areas was also 'tribalism', in the sense that 'immigrant' business owners from other parts of the country were distrusted with regard to their goodness and 'locals' were distrusted with regard to their competence.
Comparing the two studies, it appears that while businesspeople in Singida face many severe institutional constraints on cooperation when compared with Karlshöjden, the difference in the amount of cooperation and trust is not as great as one might have expected. How can this be?
In the Tanzanian context, small business owners made entrepreneurial use of pre-existing 'rules of the game'. Traditional organisations, such as the tribal communities, were used in new ways for solving business conflicts. Their mechanisms of sanctions enabled some level of trust. The fact that women are fully responsible for their children was used as a natural situation of 'hostage' when female business owners were trusted on the basis that they could not easily disappear from the town. The same applies when business owners with fixed assets, like a house, were trusted since they would not benefit from disappearing from the town. In Karlshöjden, Sweden, such entrepreneurial trust creation was not observed. Cooperation was introduced top-down as a requirement in the tourism project, but it was possible to choose not to participate. The economic constraints were not as strong as in Tanzania.
From the comparison, I contend that when people in given situations perceive a sufficiently strong mutual need to cooperate, entrepreneurial activity is provoked and they may imaginatively create their own mechanisms to facilitate trust. This might be regarded as an example of community entrepreneurship being practised by far from privileged actors as part of their everyday life (Steyaert & Katz 2004) . While morality and norms of reciprocity for example are simultaneously present among the business owners (cf. Frank 1988 , Solomon 1999 ) it is my interpretation that the main driving force behind entrepreneurial trust creation was a strong need. The lack of a sufficiently strong need to cooperate may thus explain why the project in Karlshöjden was characterised by conflict as much as by cooperation.
Apart from pre-existing institutions, the tree of trust also received nutrients from the entrepreneurship of actors on the micro level. Inadequate institutions are not definite obstacles to cooperation, since people are entrepreneurial when it is needed. A third and important source of nutrient to the tree of trust, and to the rules of the game, should be added to figure 1:
entrepreneurship. The comparison suggests that such entrepreneurship may often be necessity driven.
This entrepreneurial trust creation does not occur in a vacuum. Inadequate formal institutions necessitated the action, and informal institutions such as tribal organisation and female responsibilities for children were drawn upon. The relationship between formal and informal/indigenous institutions has been discussed by many (North 1990 , Berry 1993 ). There may be lock-in effects due to people being more used to the indigenous institutions (Havnevik and Hårsmar 1999 ), yet I contend that people use the mechanisms they need and can trust (cf.
Giddens 1990). It would be in line with the findings here to suggest that, faced with changes in the formal institutional framework, informal institutions will also change.
In the meantime, entrepreneurial trust creation is important for breaking the vicious circles of distrust, since this trust creation enables cooperation. As cooperation and other kinds of interaction are initiated, trust is developed as a consequence (cf. also Gambetta 1988 , Gulati 1995 , Sztompka 1999 . In Karlshöjden, the tourism association had the unintended consequence (Giddens 1984 , Sydow 2000 of bringing the people together, leading to the start of the Square Dance initiative. In Singida, the business-owners met at the business training seminars and interacted across borders of tribe and gender to form a Savings and Credit
Cooperative Society.
The cases also illustrate how the rules of the game are transformed by interventions and entrepreneurship and that such transformation does not always take many years. In Tanzania, the business owner's perceptions of 'the rules of the game' at their disposal were limited. The training intervention proved suitable since it widened their frames of reference about business principles in general and book-keeping and contract writing in particular. This enabled them to make informed choices as to which rules of the game to act in accordance to. Knowledge of keeping records and writing contracts especially had immediate impact on the formation of a Savings and Credit Cooperative. New practices were also created, as the Chamber of Commerce took responsibility for solving business conflicts in Singida. In Karlshöjden, an attitudinal change took place and a wider circle of people around the enthusiasts entered into, or considered entering, some kind of cooperation. Yet, the changes in Karlshöjden were of a more minor character, arguably due to the lower need for cooperation.
Contributions to Theory and Practice
Through empirical examples from comparative longitudinal studies of two divergent contexts, this article has highlighted the importance of necessity driven entrepreneurial trust creation. In the terms of Child and Möllerings (2003) , this article has illustrated strategies for active trust creation. However, it has also focused on the role of the institutional environment in which this process is embedded.
Many similarities between the contexts were found and perhaps surprisingly to the reader, Tanzanian entrepreneurship and Swedish 'tribalism' were observed. Similar informal institutions (prejudices based on gender and 'tribalism' as well as jealousy) affect trust and cooperation in very different contexts. These were just manifested in somewhat different ways.
The studies suggest that entrepreneurship complements formal and informal institutions as nutrients to the tree of trust. The cases show how these three nutrients can substitute for each other. Studying only one, or even two, of these factors may thus give misleading results. The quality of the soil from which trust and cooperation are to grow is created by the local mix of the three nutrients and their interaction with each other. Due attention should thus also be given to informal institutions and entrepreneurial action in the trust creation process.
As to the possibilities of 'artificial fertilisation' of the tree of trust, the studies show that it has limited possibilities for success unless the need for cooperation is strong enough for the target group. This is a risk in top-down introduction of cooperation as in the EU-funded project in
Karlshöjden. If the need exists however, opportunities for artificial fertilisation seem good.
Creating arenas for business owners to meet and interact appear to be an especially suitable route towards facilitating the entrepreneurial trust creation process. Cooperation tends to emerge as an unintended consequence of other activities. Organising business training, as in the Tanzanian case, seems especially fruitful. The arena can then be managed in such a way as to maximise interaction between male and female business owners, as well as between people of different 'tribes'. In the development context, new rules of the game, such as contract writing and bookkeeping, may also be introduced.
Funds are allocated to the support of small-business cooperation through various projects and organisations both in the west and in developing countries, not least for purposes of regional development. Are the local prerequisites, in terms of the rules of the game, taken into due consideration in the majority of all these initiatives? I hope that this article has illustrated the importance of doing so.
With regard to methodology, contrasting two divergent contexts enabled both a deeper understanding of the contexts in themselves and a comparison revealing both differences and similarities. The methodology is rare in the literature on trust and cooperation. I contend that further comparative in-depth studies into the role of rules of the game in the trust creation process in differing contexts would be a fruitful route towards an understanding of the contextuality of trust, and hence of business cooperation. 
Game
Formal institutions
Informal Institutions
